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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the relationship between competition and cost reducing investments
in the context of a location model. In particular, we derive the symmetric subgame−perfect
equilibrium of a three−stage circular city model with closed−loop strategies, and study the
effects of changes in competition fundamentals under both a given number of firms and free
entry
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between market competition and cost reducing investments (henceforth CRIs) has 
been widely analyzed in both the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition
1. However, in the 
context of location models, this issue has been investigated, to the best of our knowledge, only for 
the case of open-loop strategies by Raith (2003), who considers CRIs in the form of non-observable 
incentives to managers to exert effort. In this paper, we generalize the analysis by allowing for  
more general functions of marginal cost and CRI cost and, above all, for closed-loop strategies. We 
set up a three-stage spatial competition model à la Salop (1979), where firms decide whether to 
enter the market and then invest in cost reduction and compete in prices. After deriving the 
symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium, we study the effects of changes in competition 
fundamentals (entry costs, transport costs or product substitutability, market size) on equilibrium for 
both the short run (i.e. with a given number of firms) and the long run (free-entry).  
With respect to the case of open-loop strategies, here a major difficulty lies in expressing the 
price reaction functions in terms of the vector of competitors’ CRIs. For this purpose, we establish 
some relevant properties of the inverse of the reaction function coefficients matrix. Considering 
closed-loop strategies allows us to take into account a strategic commitment effect involving a 
lower investment in CRIs. 
 
2. The model 
Consider a market populated by n firms symmetrically located on the unit circle at  n i yi / = ,    with 
i = 1, … , n, and by a continuum of consumers of measure m uniformly distributed on the circle. 
Each consumer buys one unit of the good at most, provided that the surplus she derives from her 
purchase is nonnegative. Let a be the utility arising from consuming one unit of the good and t the 
unit transport cost. The surplus that a consumer located at x derives from purchasing from a firm 
located at yi  is: 
( ) ( )
2 x y t p a x V i i i − − − = ,                     (1) 
where  i p  is the price set by firm i and  ( )
2 x y t i −  measures the quadratic transport costs borne by 
consumers
2.  
Consumers choose the supplier that maximizes their surplus, subject to the rationality constraint 
()0 ≥ x Vi . Given the assumption of symmetric location, the marginal consumers of firm i (i.e., those 
                                                 
1 A recent paper by Vives (2004) provides a comprehensive survey of the large body of work now existing on the topic. 
2 With quadratic transport costs the symmetric case can be proved to supply an equilibrium configuration; see Novshek 
(1980) and Economides (1989). Most of the following results also hold with linear transport costs.   2
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+ + . Therefore, if a is sufficiently high to allow 
all consumers to buy one unit of the good, firm individual demand is: 
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and profits are:  
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where F are entry costs and  ) ( i z c  and  ) ( i z b  are respectively marginal costs and the cost of CRIs. In 
what follows we will assume  0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ c , 0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ ′ c , 0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ b  and   0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ ′ b . 
  Firms take part in a sequential three-stage game. In the first stage, each firm decides whether to 
enter the market. In the second and third stage firms choose CRIs and prices.  
 
3. Equilibrium 
Consider the price subgame first. At this stage, firms have already stated their CRIs so that marginal 
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To find the vector of equilibrium price, we therefore need to solve the system: 
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h Λ  
The reaction function coefficients matrix Λ is symmetric and circulant. It is positive definite 
and invertible, so that system (5) admits solution. As is well known, its inverse 
1 Λ
−  is in turn 
symmetric and circulant. We can therefore state the following lemma. 
   3
Lemma 1: Let  ij λ  be a generic element of matrix 
1 Λ
− . For any value of n and i, the following 
properties hold: (1)  1 >
ii λ  ; (2)  2 = ∑j
ij λ ; (3)  1 0 < ≤ ij λ  for any  i j ≠ ; (4) 
i i i i , 1 , 1 + − =λ λ  ; (5) 
( ) 2 1 2 2 1
, , 1 , , 1 i i i i i i i i λ λ λ λ − = − = −
− − . 
 
Proof: Property 1 derives from the fact that positive definite matrices have  ii
i , i / λ λ 1 ≥ , with 
equality if and only if  i j ii ≠ ∀ = 0 λ  (see Rao, 1973, page 74, property 20.2). In our case clearly 
1 = ii λ , 0 ≠ ij λ  for  1 ± = i j  and 0 = ij λ otherwise, so that  1 >
i , i λ . To prove property (2), consider a 
generic row of matrix Λ , say, without loss of generality, the first row. Multiplying by 
1 Λ
− , one 
gets the system 
0 ...
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where  j λ  and  j λ  are respectively the j-th element of the first row of Λ and 
1 Λ
− . By summing by 
column, one obtains: 





j j λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ  
hence: 
∑ ∑ = j
j / λ λ 1 . 
In our specific case,  2 / 1 = ∑ j λ  whence  2 = ∑
j λ . Since Λ can be seen as a Leontief matrix, its 
inverse has only nonnegative elements and therefore, from (1) and (2), property (3) follows. 
Property (4) follows from the fact that 
1 Λ
−  is symmetric and circulant. Finally, property (5) can be 
proved by multiplying Λ times  1 Λ− . Considering, without loss of generality, row i and column i, 
one obtains the equality  1
4 4
, 1 , 1
, = − −
+ − i i i i
i i λ λ
λ , whence by property (4) and after some trivial 
a l g e b r a ,   p r o p e r t y   ( 5 )   f o l l o w s .                 □ 
 
On the basis of Lemma 1, we can write the price reaction function of firm i in terms of the CRIs 








2 + =                   ( 6 )    4
where 
i λ  denotes the i-th row of matrix 
1 Λ
− , and c(z) is the column vector of marginal costs 
() ) ( ..., ), ( ), ( 2 1 n z c z c z c .  
Moving to the CRIs stage, each firm sets its CRIs by maximizing profits under the optimal 
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2 c(z) λ c(z) λ c(z) λ c(z) λ π .        (7) 
By using properties (2), (4) and (5) of Lemma 1, the conditions for 
∗
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c(z) λ c(z) λ
λ λ π   (SOC) 
Limiting our attention to the symmetric equilibrium, it is easy to show that, since ( )
2 2
i i z ∂ ∂ π  is 
monotonically increasing in n, a sufficient condition for the SOC to hold is that the unit transport 
cost is sufficiently high, i.e. 
Assumption 1: 
))] ( ( )) ( ( [ 2
)) ( ( (
2 2 2
n z c m n z b n
n z c n m
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where  2 1
, 1i i− − = λ γ  and  F am n / =  is the largest conceivable equilibrium number of firms
3.  
The symmetric optimal CRIs 
∗ z  are therefore given by 
0 ) (
2
) ( ) (
*
, 1










                ( 8 )  
The second term in (8) accounts for the strategic commitment effect, which is absent in the case of 
open-loop strategies. Due to the convexity of  ) ( i z c  and  ) ( i z b , the strategic effect involves lower 
CRIs, consistently with the taxonomy of Bulow et al. (1985). As is known from other contexts, 
when firms compete à la Bertrand, they can gain by taking actions at a prior stage that commit 
themselves to higher costs (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). 
Recalling property (2) of Lemma 1, symmetric equilibrium prices and profits are therefore 
) ( 2
* ∗ + = z c
n
t
p                  ( 9 )  
                                                 
3 Given the assumption that the gross utility a is sufficiently high to allow all consumers to buy the good, the largest 
overall revenues are am and therefore the largest possible number of firms is  F am n / = .   5





* π             ( 1 0 )  
CRIs and prices as determined  by (8) and (9) constitute a unique symmetric subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. With respect to the case of open-loop, here the presence of a strategic effect on CRIs 
involves higher marginal costs, prices and profits. 
Simple exercises of comparative statics allow us to derive the effects of changes in the 
fundamentals of competition on equilibrium: 
 
Result 1 (given number of firms): When market size m increases, CRIs increase, prices decrease 
and profits may increase or decrease. When the transport cost t increases, CRIs are unaffected 
while both prices and profits increase. When entry costs F increase, profits decrease.  
 
The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted. The economic intuition is simple as well: 
increases in m involve larger 
∗ z , because with larger individual market size, the marginal benefit of 
CRIs increases. The consequent reduction in production costs lowers prices. The ambiguous effect 
on profits is due to the fact that a larger market also induces an increase in CRIs costs  ) (
* z b  which 
may outweigh the larger revenues. Changes in t and F do not alter marginal costs and benefits of 
CRIs, and so they have the same impact on prices and profits as in the standard Salop model. 
 
4. Endogenous market structure 
Moving to an endogenous market structure, we must take into account that the elements of the 
matrix 
1 Λ
−  (in particular  
i , i 1 − λ ) change over n. Numerical computations indicate that 
i , i 1 − λ  is 
equal to 0.4 for n = 3, slightly decreases until n = 7 and then becomes approximately constant at the 
value 0.309. 
This behavior is intuitively sensible. Since decisions are strategic complements, when the 
number of firms is larger than 3, the reactions of firm i’s closest competitors to the CRIs of firm i 
tend to be weaker because they have to take into account the reaction of their own rivals. Therefore, 
the under-investment in CRIs of firm i due to strategic effect is lower. However, the marginal 
impact of this “trickle-around” effect on the size of CRIs is lower and lower as the number of 
competitors increases, and vanishes when  7 ≥ n . 
 Assuming 
i , i 1 − λ  constant
4 and treating n as a continuous variable, the impact of changes in the 
number of firms on the equilibrium values of CRIs can be calculated by implicitly deriving (8): 
                                                 
4 This assumption is introduced only for the sake of simplicity. Numerical computations indicate that all the following 
results also hold for n < 7.   6
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Given the convexity of  ) (z c  and  ) (z b , increases in the number of firms lead to decreasing CRIs 
because the individual market size decreases. 
From (9) and (10), and taking into account (8) and (11), the effects of changes in n on profits 
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Concerning (12), Assumption 1 is sufficient to ensure that the expression in the square brackets is 
positive and so that profits are decreasing with n. In fact, even if the reduction in CRIs cost  ) ( i z b  
tends to raise profits, the greater competition pushes them downward, always dominating the former 
effect. Conversely, changes in the number of competitors n has an overall ambiguous impact on 
prices. Indeed, due to larger marginal costs following the reduction in CRIs, prices may go up;  
instead, if the effect of greater competition prevails, prices will decrease. This result is different 
from that obtained in the case of open-loop strategy where, as the strategic commitment effect is 
absent, the competition effect always dominates the cost effect. 
  We are now able to study the impact of changes in competition fundamentals F , t and m  on 
the number of firms under free-entry and therefore on the equilibrium values of CRIs and prices for 
an endogenous market structure. 
 
Result 2 (free entry):  For higher entry costs, the free-entry number of firms decreases and 
therefore CRIs increase. For higher transport costs, the free-entry number of firms increases and 
therefore CRIs decrease. In both cases, the effect on prices is ambiguous. For larger market size, 
the free-entry number of firms may increase or decrease and so do CRIs and prices. 
 
Proof: From (12),  0 < ∂ ∂
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. The effects of competition fundamentals 
on CRIs and prices follow immediately from  (11)  and  (13).          □   7
 
Therefore, when n  is endogenously determined by the free-entry condition, the effects of 
greater competition on CRIs depend on the specific fundamental of competition that one is 
considering. CRIs are higher in markets with lower transport costs, but lower with lower entry 
costs. The effect of larger markets on CRIs is ambiguous just because a larger market size has 
ambiguous effects on profits and 
∗ n . Moreover, since the impact of changes in the number of firms 
on prices is ambiguous, the effects of changes in F , t and m  on 
∗ p  are ambiguous as well.   8
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